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NOTE
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION RIGHTS: IS
THIS A TORT?: OWENS V. OWENS
In 1985, a Louisiana court addressed for the first time the question
of whether the intentional interference with the visitation rights of a
noncustodial parent can give rise to a civil cause of action in tort for
damages. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal answered this
question negatively, when the noncustodial parent of a two year old
child filed suit against the custodial parent seeking damages for willful
interference with court ordered visitation rights.'
The Owens were married and had one daughter. When their daughter
was one year old, the Owens were judicially separated, and the court
awarded sole custody to the mother. Mr. Owens was granted specific
visitation rights which allowed him access to his daughter one weekend
a month, alternating holidays, Father's Day, and two weeks each sum-
mer. Nevertheless, Mrs. Owens consistently prevented her husband from
seeing his daughter, with the result that he was unable to exercise his
visitation rights, with one exception, for nearly a year after the sepa-
ration. The exception occurred when Mrs. Owens was jailed for contempt
for not delivering her daughter to him. After several unsuccessful at-
tempts to see his child subsequent to his wife's jailing, Mr. Owens
brought suit against his wife for damages for intentional interference
with his visitation rights.'
The trial court rejected the plaintiff-father's demands and held that
no cause of action exists in Louisiana for the "tort" of interference
with visitation rights, as no statute authorizes such an action. The second
circuit affirmed, relying on a decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the proposition that, in the absence of statutory authority, no cause
of action exists for damages for the loss of services, support, compan-
ionship or affections of a human being.3 The court also distinguished
recognition in the Louisiana jurisprudence of an action in tort brought
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. Owens v. Owens, 471 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 So.
2d 362 (La. 1985).
2. Id. at 920-21.
3. Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927).
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by a custodial parent against a noncustodial parent for damages resulting
from interference with custodial rights.4 In conclusion, the court noted
that denying the plaintiff an action for damages did not leave him
entirely without a remedy, as reflected by plaintiff's simultaneous in-
stitution of proceedings to enforce his visitation rights,5 to have the
defendant placed in contempt 6 and to obtain custody.7
In light of the steady rise in the divorce rate in the United States
and of the resulting increase in the occurrence of child custody disputes,'
it is unfortunate that the court in Owens failed to state any policy
reasons for denying the cause of action, and that it failed to suggest
an alternative to which aggrieved parents could confidently turn for
protection of their rights. Additionally, the decision seems inconsistent
with recent legislative changes in regard to child custody and visitation
which reflect a strong public interest in allowing both parents to have
a continuing relationship with their children after separation and divorce. 9
This case note questions the effectiveness of Louisiana's current
mechanisms for enforcing visitation rights and explores the interests at
stake in post divorce disputes generally. -It also examines the feasibility
of allowing a civil suit in damages for interference with visitation rights
in light of current Louisiana policy, and suggests alternative courses of
action.
Louisiana Law and Policy Towards The Parent/Child Relationship
After Separation and Divorce
Louisiana Civil Code articles 146 and 157 provide the statutory
scheme which governs the issues engendered by a child custody dispute.
Legislative changes to that scheme in recent years have replaced the
"maternal preference" rule with a rebuttable presumption that joint
custody is in the best interest of the minor child.' 0 Louisiana courts
4. Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
5. La. R.S. 9:305 (Supp. 1985) states in part: "When the court renders judgement
in an action to ... enforce child visitation rights, except for good cause, the court shall
award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party."
6. La. R.S. 13:4611(l)(d) (Supp. 1985).
7. 471 So. 2d at 922 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985). After the Louisiana Supreme Court
denied writs, 475 So. 2d 362, Mr. Owens successfully secured sole custody of his daughter.
8. United States Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States
54, 82 (105th ed. 1985).
9. See discussion accompanying infra notes 10-18.
10. Under the maternal preference rule, custody was virtually always given solely to
the mother. 1979 La. Acts No. 718 initiated the shift of emphasis away from this rule,
amending articles 146 and 157 to provide that custody be granted to the "husband or
wife" and that no preference be "given on the basis of the sex of the parent." 1981
La. Acts No. 283 further amended these articles "to provide for joint custody" and "to
[Vol. 47
NOTE
have held that "[tihis presumption is properly rebutted by a showing
that a different arrangement is in the child's best interest."'' With respect
to the implementation of the joint custody presumption, the Civil Code
requires that "[physical care and custody ... be shared by the parents
in such a way as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact
with both parents."' 2 Consistent with this requirement, the court in
Plemar v. Plemar"3 interpreted joint custody as "a physical sharing of
the child in addition to both parents participating in decisions affecting
the child's life-e.g., education, medical problems, recreation, etc.' ' 4
Nevertheless, the physical sharing of the custody of the child which
the Civil Code describes is limited to that which is "feasible. '"'5 Among
the factors considered to determine the feasibility of joint custody are
the "willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the
child and the other parent."' 6 This emphasis upon parental willingness
and cooperation in allowing the other parent contact with the child is
one manifestation of the policy underlying the entire new statutory
scheme of facilitating and continuing the parent-child relationship. The
legislature's complete about-face regarding joint custody 7 reflects a strong
provide for natural cotutorship." Joint custody still was given no preference or pre-
sumption, but was only awarded "if both husband and wife agree to joint custody and
the court deems it in the best interest of the children." 1982 La. Acts No. 307 established
an order of preference for awarding custody, and for the first time created a rebuttable
presumption in favor of joint custody. This presumption was rebuttable, however, if the
parents chose sole custody, or if the court found that joint custody was not in the best
interest of the child. 1983 La. Acts No. 695 amended article 146 to its present formulation
of the rebuttable presumption. It is notable that the presumption can no longer be rebutted
by the mere fact that the parents have chosen sole custody. La. Civ. Code art. 146 (c)
(I) & (2). See also Bordelon v. Bordelon, 390 So. 2d 1325 (La. 1980).
II. Doyle v. Doyle, 465 So. 2d 167, 170 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985). See also Turner
v. Turner, 455 So. 2d, 1374 (La. 1984).
12. La. Civ. Code art. 146 (D).
13. 436 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
14. Id. at 1350.
15. La. Civ. Code art. 146 (D). See also Plemar, in which the court did not interpret
joint custody to mandate a fixed rule of "a fifty-fifty sharing of time," but noted instead
that "[elach case will depend on the child's age, the parents' availability and desires, and
other factors." 436 So. 2d at 1350.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 146 (D) states that the factors in (C) (2) will be applied.
These are the same factors used in the initial determination of whether joint custody is
in the best interests of the child.
17. The maternal preference rule was operative from 1825-1979, during which time
any arrangement which even closely resembled divided custody was frowned upon. La.
Civ. Code art. 146 (1825). See also Johnson v. Johnson, 214 La. 912, 39 So. 2d 340
(1949) ("[Tihe welfare of a child . . . requires a custody and control under an undivided
authority, and ... visitation [by the noncustodial parent] should never in any case be
extended to the point where it becomes divided custody or a division of such authority.").
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belief that the child, and in turn the parents, would normally be best
served by the child's continuous stable contact with both parents. 8
Since the enactment of the new legislation, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent, has rec-
ognized the noncustodial parent's right of visitation as "a natural right
... enforceable in a civil action when the custodial parent denies vis-
itation access."1 9 In the same decision, the court held that the father
of an illegitimate child could not be denied visitation solely because the
child was illegitimate.20 The court found that a presumption existed in
favor of visitation, relying in part on the view that visitation is 'im-
portant for a child's whole growth, mental, physical and spiritual,"'
and that, as a result, denial of visitation could cause the child to feel
rejected and confused.2
Louisiana law and policy as thus far described embodies the sub-
stance and spirit of current United States Supreme Court rulings. With
regard to termination of parental rights, the Supreme Court has warned
that, "a parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody
and management of his or her children is an important interest that
'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection.' ' 22 Although when the Court made this statement
it was addressing the issue of terminating parental rights, a parent of
a child, legitimate or illegitimate, who is deprived of visitation arguably
feels the same loss as a parent whose rights have been terminated.
Although the court in Owens recognized that the father had available
certain remedies,23 it failed to acknowledge that his attempts to gain
access to his child through those remedies had repeatedly been futile.
It is the fact of deterrence, more than merely that of compensation,
18. See Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375, 379 (La. 1983) wherein the court stated:
"IT]he 'best interest' standard can only be correctly applied with a real cognizance of
the widely accepted view that it is generally in the child's best interest to have continued
contact with noncustodial parents." (citations omitted).
19. Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375, 376 (La. 1983)(citing Roshto v. Roshto,
214 La. 922, 39 So. 2d 344 (1949); Johnson v. Johnson, 214 La. 912, 39 So. 2d 340
(1949); Pierce v. Pierce, 213- La. 475, 35 So. 2d 22 (1948); Jacquet v. Disimone, 175 La.
617, 143 So. 710 (1932)).
20. Id. at 380.
21. Id. at 379 (quoting Pierce v. Yerkovich, 80 Misc. 2d 613, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403,
410 (1974)).
22. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2159-
60 (1981)(citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212 (1972)). See
also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S. Ct. 840, 843 (1953)(parental rights are
"far more precious ... than property rights"); In re Howard, 382 So. 2d 194, 198 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1980)(termination of parental rights is a "unique kind of deprivation").
23. The court stated: "He may institute proceedings to enforce his visitation rights
.... He may institute contempt proceedings or he may institute proceedings to obtain
custody of the child for himself." 471 So. 2d at 922.
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which granting a cause of action in damages offers. In this case, the
object of deterrence was limiting the already considerable length of
time-an entire year-during which Mr. Owens was denied access to his
daughter. It is clear that such an object serves the fundamental policy
currently underlying Louisiana law of ensuring continuous contact be-
tween the noncustodial parent and the child. The question necessarily
arises, however, whether a civil cause of action in tort is a desirable
means to achieve this goal. Before directly answering that question,
however, it is worthwhile comparing the action for interference with
visitation privileges with a cause of action which Louisiana courts have
recognized-i.e., the action for interfence with custody.
The Cause of Action for Interference With Custody: How Relevant is
the Distinction?
In Spencer v. Terebelo,24 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal upheld a cause of action in tort brought by a custodial parent
against the noncustodial parent for the intentional deprivation of custody.
Other jurisdictions have also treated interference with full custody as
an actionable tort. 2 The court in Owens distinguished Spencer on three
grounds: first, because Spencer involved an action instituted by a cus-
todial parent rather than a noncustodial parent; second, because in
Spencer there had been a violation of a criminal statute; and finally,
because Spencer did not deviate from the general rule set forth by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Moulin v. Monteleone regarding the need
for a statutory basis for an action for damages for loss of companionship
or affection of a human being.26
The distinction between a custodial and a noncustodial parent-plain-
tiff is an unconvincing basis upon which to deny recovery to a parent
who is prevented from exercising his visitation rights. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has referred to visitation as a "species" of custody,
thus recognizing that the two are necessarily related.27 Moreover, as
noted above, a parent has certain natural rights which demand great
deference and which exist independently of custody or noncustody. That
a court has awarded custody to one parent does not give that parent
the right to negate the rights of the noncustodial parent. In fact, the
noncustodial parent is arguably in much greater need of protection, since
24. 373 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
25. See, e.g., Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706, 711 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(citing Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. App. 1982); Kipper v. Vokolek, 546
S.W.2d 521 (Mo. App. 1977); Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1983); Lloyd v.
Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982)).
26. 471 So. 2d at 921.
27. Maxwell v. Leblanc, 434 So. 2d at 377.
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the custodial parent is able to control when or if visitation will take
place.28 Consequently, just as the noncustodial parent owes a duty to
the custodial parent not to interfere with custody, 29 the custodial parent
should be held to owe an equal duty to the noncustodial parent not to
interfere with the parent-child relationship which visitation is designed
to protect.30 The status of a plaintiff as a custodial or noncustodial
parent, then, is only a matter of degree and should relate to the extent
of damages rather than to liability."
Furthermore, the emphasis by the court in Owen on the need for
a statutory duty-i.e., the second basis of distinction from Spencer52-
was misplaced. In light of the "natural right" to visitation described
above, a legal duty not to interfere with court ordered visitation rights
may exist independently of any statutory authority. Even so, there was
ample statutory authority from which the court in Owen could have
derived the duty it required. One example is Louisiana Revised Statutes
14:133.1,11 which imposes upon every individual a legal duty to obey
court orders. The visitation rights granted by the court at the separation
proceedings prior to Owens imposed a legal duty upon the defendant
to comply, and her failure to do so clearly amounted to a breach of
that duty. In addition, article 146 implies a legal duty on the part of
both parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing rela-
tionship between the child and the other parent. This duty may be
28. In theory, or course, the custodial parent must abide by the visitation plan as
mandated in the custody judgment. Nevertheless, in practice, he or she can dictate the
terms under which visitation will occur.
29. Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200.
30. This duty, as well as a similar duty to noncustodial parents owed by third persons,
has been recognized in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Sheltra v. Smith, 136 Vt.
472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978); Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985); Ruffalo v.
United States, 590 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Pyle v. Pyle, II Ohio App. 3d 31,
463 N.E.2d 98 (1983); Knight v. Dixon, No. 123873 (Super. Ct. Wash. Oct. 21, 1975);
Johannes V. Sloan, No. 79-L-169 (Kankakee County Cir. Ct. Ill. March 25, 1981); Memmer
v. Memmer, No. 45503 (Fairfax- County Cir. Ct. Va. 1979). See also A Comparative
Analysis, 4 B.C. Inter'l and Comp. Law Rev. 283, 312 (1981), which discusses the
availability of a cause of action for damages for interference with visitation rights under
French Civil Code articles 247 (4) and 289.
31. Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706, 711 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
32. 471 So. 2d at 921 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985). The court in Owens noted that
Spencer involved the violation of a criminal statute, La. R.S. 14:45 A (4), Which establishes
a legal duty in favor of the custodial parent.
33. La. R.S. 14:133.1 (Supp. 1986) provides:
Whoever, by threats or force, or wilfully prevents, obstructs, impedes, or in-
terferes with, or wilfully attempts to prevent, obstruct, impede, or interfere
with, the due exercise of rights or the performance of duties under any order,
judgment, or decree of a court of the state of Louisiana, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
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derived from both the basic premise behind the joint custody statute,
and from the statute itself) 4
Finally, it may be argued that Moulin v. Monteleone," on which
the court in Owens relied for its final distinction of Spencer, has been
statutorily overruled. The court in Owen cited Moulin for the proposition
that absent a statute, there is no right of action for damages for loss
of services, companionship or affection of a human being. Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315 as amended by Act 202 of 1982, however, now
allows a cause of action for loss of services, support and companion-
ship.3 6 The article is arguably broad enough in scope to provide relief
for any injury formerly rendered unactionable by Moulin.
In the end, there seems to be no convincing reason for allowing a
cause of action in favor of the custodial parent, but not in favor of
the noncustodial parent. The question must still be asked, however,
whether allowing these suits between ex-spouses is the best approach to
this problem, and if not, what alternatives exist.
Support For a Civil Cause of Action For Intentional Interference
With Visitation
A number of jurisdictions have upheld, under the theory of inten-
tional infliction of mental distress, a cause of action brought by a
noncustodial parent for interference with visitation rights,"7 and at least
one court has recognized the tort of "interference with visitation" with-
out resorting to the more commonly accepted "mental distress" theory.38
Additionally, Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes the tort of "out-
rageous conduct causing severe emotional distress," 3 9 which may also
provide a theory of recovery in this context.
The Supreme Court of Vermont, in Sheltra v. Smith, 40 found that
a noncustodial mother had stated a cause of action when she brought
suit based on the defendant's 'rendering it impossible for any personal
contact or communication to take place between the Plaintiff and her
daughter."' 4 The court described the elements of the action as "out-
rageous conduct, done intentionally or with reckless disregard of the
probability of causing emotional distress, resulting in suffering of extreme
34. See La. Civ. Code art. 146 (C) (2) (j).
35. 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927).
36. 1982 La. Acts No. 202 (effective September 10, 1982).
37. See supra note 30.
38. The court in Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1984), did
not use the term "intentional infliction of emotional distress" as a theory for recovery,
but rather based the cause of action on intentional interference with visitation rights.
39. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1963).
40. 136 Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978).
41. Id. at 433.
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emotional distress, actually or proximately caused by the outrageous
conduct." ' 42 It was conceded in a later case that the plaintiff in Sheltra
was the noncustodial parent43 and that she was allowed to recover
damages for this deprivation of visitation which lasted only one month."
In a recent United States Court of Appeal case, 45 the fourth circuit
upheld a jury award of $40,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000
in punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, when
a custodial mother prevented the noncustodial father from exercising his
visitation privileges. The court found that the father had stated a cause
of action even though Virginia, which provided the substantive law, had
abolished the tort of alienation of affections.4 6 The court reasoned that,
'"[the fact that a tort may have overtones of affection alienation does
not bar recovery on the separate and distinct accompanying wrongdoing
[of emotional distress]," and that "[t]he unwarranted breach in the
physical relationship and its resulting adverse impact on the father would
have entitled [him) to some damages, even if the affection of his son
for him remained unabated.1 47 In response to the argument that this
approach may cause an "avalanche of cases," the court noted the
limiting effect of the proof required to sustain the action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, stating that "much more than simply
aggravation must be shown." ' 4 The court also found that the need to
provide a remedy and to deter the harm caused by the deliberate frus-
42. Id.
43. Ruffalo, 590 F. Supp at 711.
44. Vermont's custody statute, unlike Louisiana's, neither requires nor expressly pro-
hibits joint custody. The statute requires the court to make a determination of what is
in the "best interest" of the child, in light of, but not limited to the following factors:
I) The wishes of the parents as to the custody of the child;
2) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parent or
parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interest;
3) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
4) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 652 (1984). Also, neither parent enjoys a presumption of a right
to custody in his or her favor due to the sex of the parent or of the child. Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, § 652 (1984).
While the Vermont statutory scheme does not favor joint custody as does Louisiana's,
it still reflects a policy that contact with both parents is in the best interest of the child.
In light of Louisiana's even stronger policy favoring continuous contact of children with
both of their parents, Louisiana courts may be even more justified in allowing a cause
of action for intentional interference with visitation.
45. Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985).
* 46. Id. at 339.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 340.
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tration of a close relationship between parent and child was superior
to the danger of frivolous litigation.4 9
The court in Ruffalo v. United States0 stated assertively that a
cause of action in tort should be allowed for the intentional interference
with the "visitation and communication rights" of a noncustodial parent.
In this case, liability was imposed upon the United States Government. 5'
The court criticized McGrady v. Rosenbaum 2 (relied on in Owens),
wherein a New York court rejected a damage claim for interference
with visitation rights, and went so far as to predict that McGrady "is
not likely to be followed by courts that are adequately sensitive to the
significance of 'frequent and continuing contact with both parents after
the parents have separated or dissolved the marriage."" ' 3 The court in
Ruffalo thus relied on the same policy considerations that underlie the
new Louisiana Civil Code provisions. The court further pointed out that
family law specialists have viewed the potential of damage suits to be
"a useful deterrent to lawless conduct. '5 4 As noted above, Owens pro-
vides the perfect example of how useful such a deterrent may be, in
light of the fruitless efforts of Mr. Owens in pursuing his "alternative
remedies" to gain access to his child.
Patricia M. Hoff, Director of the Child Custody Project at the
National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection,
strongly advocates the availability of a tort remedy in "child snatching"
cases. Under her analysis, such cases include both denial of visitation
and deprivation of custody." Not only would the victim-parent be com-
pensated for his or her injuries, but "suits of this kind may have the
49. Id.
50. 590 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
51. Id. Plaintiff Donna Ruffalo's former husband was taken into the Witness Pro-
tection Program by the United States Government. At the father's request, their son was
included in the program. Although the son had previously been under the custody of the
plaintiff, he was in the "possession" of his father pursuant to a state court order at the
time he was brought within the protection of the federal program. Under the court order,
plaintiff had reasonable visitation privileges and weekend possession for one day. As a
result of her son's being taken into the program, Mrs. Ruffalo did not see or hear from
him for almost four years. The court found that Mrs. Ruffalo had lost "visitation and
communication" rights and concluded that she would have been awarded damages against
a private individual under Missouri law. Consequently, federal liability attached under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. The court permitted this award over the objections of the
Federal Government that the child's safety and security had been at stake, and that it
was acting in good faith.
52. 62 Misc. 2d 182, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1970).
53. Ruffalo, 590 F. Supp. at 711.
54. Id.
55. P. Hoff, J. Schulman and A. Volenik, Interstate Child Custody Disputes and
Parental Kidnapping: Policy, Practice and Law, Ch. 14, at 5 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Hoff].
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beneficial side effect of compelling disclosure of the child's location." 5 6
Third-party defendants sued for conspiracy would be "apt to disclose
the child's whereabouts rather than become entangled in a potentially
expensive lawsuit." ' 7 Hoff suggests that punitive damages be assessed
for continuing violations, in order to increase the incentive to restore
the child to the lawful custodian. Hoff also criticizes decisions such as
McGrady as being: "pre-UCCJA [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act] case[s] [which reflect] a judicial conservatism which did not ade-.
quately address the problems inherent in interstate custody kidnapping
... [and] concealment." 58 It is important to recognize that the act of
concealment occurs in both custody and visitation violations. For ex-
ample, in Owens, the mother moved the child to Texas and effectively
concealed her whereabouts from the father, causing him considerable
distress and expense. 9
A final argument for making available a cause of action in tort in
Louisiana for interference with visitation rights is that such a cause of
action is not inconsistent with Louisiana tort law. This is especially clear
when Louisiana law is examined with reference to the court's analysis
in Ruffalo. In Ruffalo, the court found that, while Missouri had not
yet allowed claims for loss of society of a parent or child in personal
injury cases (as opposed to death cases), recovery was not precluded. 60
In Louisiana, by contrast, damages for loss of society, support and
companionship as a result of an offense or quasi-offense which results
in death as well as personal injury, are available. 6' Furthermore, Lou-
isiana courts have permitted recovery of damages for mental pain and
suffering caused by an offense or quasi-offense committed against the
plaintiff and unaccompanied by physical injury. 62 In addition, Louisiana,
like Missouri, 63 makes no distinction between custodial and noncustodial
parents when considering a cause of action for these damages. 64 It would
seem, then, that recovery should be as available for damages caused by
direct interference with association and companionship as for damages
caused indirectly by an accident.6 5 Allowing recovery to a noncustodial
56. Hoff, supra note 55, Ch. 13, at 9.
57. Id., Ch. 14, at i.
58. Id., Ch. 14, at 15.
59. Information received by the author from Mr. Owens' attorney during the course
of a telephone interview, October 1985.
60. 590 F. Supp. at 712.
61. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 (A) & (B).
62. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1961);
Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
63. Ruffalo, 590 F. Supp. at 712.
64. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 (B); Daniels v. Conn, 382 So. 2d 945 (La. 1980); Cathey
v. Bernard, 467 So. 2d 9 (La. App. ist Cir. 1985).
65. 590 F. Supp. at 712.
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parent for mental distress due to a loss of society and companionship
as a result of intentional interference with visitation rights should not
be inconsistent with Louisiana law.
Reasons for Denying a Civil Cause of Action for Intentional
Interference With Visitation
Although a civil cause of action for damages resulting from inter-
ference with visitation has been allowed in some states, strong arguments
exist (apart from those relied on in Owens) for denying this type of
recovery. The creation of a new civil liability must be carefully consid-
ered, with a view toward all potential repercussions.
While Louisiana courts have expressed the policy of protecting Lou-
isiana citizens from the wrongful acts of others, 66 in family law cases
this broad policy must be considered together with the more narrow,
and now paramount, policy of serving the best interests of the child.
A dissenting opinion in an Iowa Supreme Court decision, Wood v.
Wood,6 argues that the child may be injured, rather than benefitted,
by allowing monetary damages for interference with custody. 68 . In that
dissent, Justice Wolle asserts that it is in the best interest of the child
that parental bitterness and resentment be kept in check, an interest
which may be thwarted by the creation of a civil suit for damages which
might add yet another "weapon for the arsenal of litigants engaging in
marital or post-marital warfare."169 Wolle also points to the problem of
burdening already strained court dockets. Not only might the suit for
interference with custody invite a counter-claim for violation of visitation
rights, but there is the possibility that children as well as parents may
eventually be allowed to sue. Might grandparents also sue for denial of
visitation rights?7 ° Where do we draw the line? Could a parent sue for
a single instance of denial of visitation or only after several blatant
violations?
An additional argument against allowing damages for the denial of
visitation is that the damage award comes either directly or indirectly
out of funds used to support the child.7 Also, the noncustodial parent
could merely be seeking a means of recovering past alimony or child
support payments. There is no guarantee that he is genuinely concerned
66. Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973)(state has policy of
protecting its citizens from damage caused by the wrongful acts of others).
67. 338 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1983).
68. Id. at 127-30 (Wolle, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 127 (Wolle, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 128 (Wolle, J., dissenting).
71. But see Ruffalo, where the defendant who was required to pay damages was the
United States Government, rather than the custodial parent.
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with maintaining contact with the child. The child may therefore be
deprived of financial as well as moral support during the course of the
litigation. Since the potential for abuse exists, a system of checks would
have to be implemented to control the availability of this kind of relief.
Limitation on damages, and an exhaustion of remedies requirement are
examples of such safeguards.
Finally, it should be noted that one court has found that the tort
of intentional infliction of mental distress is inapplicable to the depri-
vation of visitation rights. The New York court in McGrady refused to
allow the father to collect damages for the mother's alleged denial of
his visitation rights. 72 The Louisiana court of appeal in Owens explicitly
followed McGrady in denying recovery. Both the McGrady and Owens
courts failed to give compelling reasons for their decisions, stating merely
that a cause of action for damages was not among the current remedies
available to parents in these situations. When confronted with the ar-
gument that New York now allows recovery for intentional infliction
of mental distress absent proof of the breach of any duty other than
the duty not to inflict, the court stated:
[S]trong policy considerations militate against judicially applying
these recent developments in this area of the law to the factual
context of a dispute arising out of matrimonial differences. To
sustain the claim for damages, would result in a revival of evils
not unlike those which prompted the Legislature ... to outlaw
actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation."
The "evils" mentioned in McGrady were found to be inconsequential
in Raftery v. Scott,74 in which the court allowed a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from a denial of
visitation. It was in this case that the court reasoned that, although
Virginia had abolished the tort of alienation of affections, the cause of
action for denial of visitation was distinguishable and should be allowed.
The adverse consequences of allowing a civil suit for damages for
interference with custody or visitation, such as increased animosity,
burdening of the dockets and, most importantly, the deprivation of
funds for the child, are real; nevertheless, a system may be developed
to minimize these adverse effects while maximizing the possibility of
achieving the ultimate goal of reducing violations of custody and vis-
itation decrees.
72. 62 Misc. 2d 182, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1970).
73. Id. at 190-91, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 189-90.




That Mr. Owens was forced to resort to a civil suit to gain access
to his child suggests a deficiency in Louisiana's current visitation en-
forcement mechanisms. The remedies presently available in Louisiana
include the institution of proceedings to enforce the decree, 75 to have
the custodial parent placed in contempt,7 6 and to obtain sole or joint
custody. 77 Failure to obey court ordered visitation can result in a fine
of up to five hundred dollars, imprisonment of up to three months, or
both.78 Finally, since Owens was decided, the Louisiana Legislature has
added yet another remedy: the posting of bond or security to insure
compliance with a child visitation order. 79 Louisiana does not allow the
withholding of alimony or child support in order to elicit compliance
with visitation rights.8 0
When evaluating the adequacy of these remedies, the willingness of
the Louisiana courts to enforce them consistently is a necessary consid-
eration. In addition, the following question must be asked: what is the
main purpose behind these remedies? Compensation to the aggrieved
parent? Compensation to the child? Punishment for disobeying a custody
decree? Enforcing the rights established in the custody decree? Since
the best interest of the child has been characterized as requiring the
greatest possible contact with both parents, enforcement must be the
main goal.
Contempt
With respect to the effectiveness of the contempt remedy, Owens
readily indicates that it will not always deter future violations: once the
mother was released, the violations continued."' Additionally, depriving
the child of its primary caretaker through jailing and/or deprivation of
financial support may do more harm than good. The unwillingness
exhibited by courts to imprison a parent for violation of a visitation
order82 is further evidence of the ineffectiveness of this remedy. Finally,
75. See La. R.S. 9:305 (Supp. 1986).
76. La. R.S. 13:4611 (Supp. 1986).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. La. R.S. 9:312 (1985).
80. Simon v. Simon, 450 So. 2d 755 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984)(failure to comply with
visitation order does not relieve father of support obligation). Several states allow ter-
mination of alimony and/or child support for denial of visitation rights, see, e.g., Szamocki
v. Szamocki, 47 Cal. App. 3d 812, 121 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1975); Hudson v. Hudson, 97
Misc. 2d 558, 412 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Smith v. Smith, 282 Minn. 190, 163
N.W.2d 852 (1968).
81. 471 So. 2d at 921.
82. Note, Making Parents Behave, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1059, 1083 (1984).
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it should be noted that, while contempt proceedings may be useful while
the violation is within the state, they afford no relief where the abductor
has left the state. 83
Change of Custody
The threat of a change of custody could prove to be the most
powerful deterrent to denying visitation rights, if the custodial parent
genuinely cares for his or her child and is not denying visitation solely
for the purpose of harming the noncustodial parent. Nevertheless, any
deterrent is self-defeating if it opposes rather than serves the interests
of the child.8 4 For this reason, the courts may find that a denial of
visitation does not merit as extreme a remedy as a change in custody.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Everett v. Everett,85 held that
interference with visitation does not merit a change in custody, absent
proof that the custodial parent's behavior has had a detrimental effect
on the child. Subsequently, however, Civil Code article 146 was amended1
6
to establish the rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best
interest of the child, even if the parents have agreed that one of them
could have sole custody. This legislative change may therefore support
an argument that the deprivation of visitation has the "detrimental
effect" that Everett requires. Nevertheless, the presumption will not
support a change from the sole custody of one parent to the sole custody
of the other. Additionally, as illustrated in Dominick v. Dominick,8
7
the court may find that due to the very fact that the parents have been
unable to agree on many matters, joint custody would also be inap-
propriate.
In Turner v. Turner,88 the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that
the presumption in favor of joint custody does not require the granting
of joint custody, as it may be rebutted "upon a proper showing that
a different arrangement is in the'child's best interest." ' 89 Because the
parents in Turner were unable to agree upon physical custody, as well
as upon how the children were to be brought up, the court found that
joint custody was not in the best interest of the children. 9° The court
in Dominick relied on Turner to reach its result. The implication from
these cases is that, in similar cases involving petitions for a change in
83. Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Iowa 1983)(noting that no extradition
procedures are available in contempt proceedings).
84. La. Civ. Code art. 146.
85. 433 So. 2d 705 (La. 1983).
86. 1983 La. Acts No. 695.
87. 470 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
88. 455 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1984).
89. Id. at 1379.
90. Id. at 1381.
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custody due to interference with visitation, courts may prefer to maintain
the status quo and leave sole custody in the present legal custodian.
The availability of a petition for a change of custody, therefore,
may not always provide an adequate remedy. Even if such a change is
awarded, there is no guarantee that a reversal of roles would not occur
with regard to denial of visitation. Finally, it should be recognized that
the noncustodial parent may be unable or unfit to have sole or joint
custody; i.e., the reasons supporting the original custody decree may
not change simply because the custodial parent denies visitation. Never-
theless, the noncustodial parent's inability to have custody of his or her
children does not render invalid his or her right and desire to visit with
them.
In cases where a noncustodial parent is unable to petition for joint
or sole custody, but he or she has demonstrated a sincere desire to visit
with his or her child, the civil cause of action in tort could prove to
be a desirable alternative. Possible safeguards against abusing this remedy
would be to require the party suing to prove that he or she has made
a diligent effort to see the child, and that a type of "exhaustion of
remedies" requirement be met. For example, after having tried to com-
municate or see the child, the noncustodial parent should have to pursue
existing remedies of contempt, a petition for enforcement of visitation
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4611, and/or the posting of bond.
Perhaps, in certain cases, the noncustodial parent should have to make
a showing of why he or she is unwilling or unable to petition for joint
custody. Additionally, the judge may be given the discretion to require
that the couple attempt to reach an agreement through mediation before
allowing the suit to proceed.
Bond
Requiring the custodial parent to post bond represents yet another
financial incentive with which to insure compliance with custody decrees.
Unlike with the proposed remedy of a civil suit for damages, there is
not the possibility of using this remedy to injure the other parent.
Requiring bond also enjoys the advantage of addressing the potential
controversy before the fact, rather than rectifying a past violation.
Nevertheless, unlike the civil suit for damages, requiring bond does not
compensate the aggrieved parent. Further, in cases such as Owens, where
the custodial parent was continuously cited for contempt for failure to
allow visitation, the posting of bond would not likely prove to be
effective.
Withholding of Support Payments
New York, along with several other jurisdictions, allows the non-
custodial parent to withhold support payments in order to enforce vis-
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itation rights. 9' This remedy has been severely criticized as being ineffective
in most cases, as well as posing a financial and emotional threat to the
child. 92 Additionally, the possibility of creating a vicious cycle exists
when support is withheld because of denial of visitation, and visitation
is denied because of withholding of support.
Mediation
Mediation, provided for in Civil Code article 146(I), can be used
to establish the initial custody and visitation agreement between the
spouses, as well as to resolve later conflicts which may arise. The
mediation process is most effective when there is present an experienced
and qualified mediator who "appreciates the psychological impact of
the divorce," 93 and who is willing to help the couple "define, narrow,
clarify, organize, and summarize issues." 9 4 Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:352 states the purpose of a mediation proceeding to be: "to reduce
the acrimony which may exist between the parties and to develop an
agreement assuring the child or children's close continuing contact with
both parents after the marriage is dissolved. The mediator shall use his
or her best efforts to effect a settlement of the custody or visitation
dispute." 95
Although mediation cannot erase the damage already suffered in
cases such as Owens, future violations may be avoided by requiring this
procedure. When an individual participates in the decision-making proc-
ess by drawing up his or her own agreement, it is more likely that the
terms of the agreement will be obeyed. Studies indicate that individuals
who reach an agreement through mediation are less likely to violate
their agreements and "engage in relitigation." 96 Additionally, many Lou-
isiana judges have expressed dissatisfaction with the adversary solution
to child custody decisions. They have been quoted as saying that they
"'dread' handling family law cases," and often do not feel qualified
to decide what is in the best interest of the child. 7
Conclusion
Visitation has been characterized as a "species of custody." 98 For
this and other reasons outlined above, it seems inequitable and incon-
91. See supra note 80.
92. Note, supra note 82.
93. Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing Family-Mediation Not Liligation,
29 Loy. L. Rev. 55, 70 (1983).
94. Id.
95. La. R.S..9:352 (1985).
96. Note, supra note 82, at 1087.
97. Comment, supra note 93, at 67.
98. 434 So. 2d at 377.
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sistent for Louisiana to allow a cause of action for interference with
custody while rejecting the same for interference with visitation rights.
The noncustodial parent has rights as equally deserving of protection
as the custodial parent. Furthermore, the custodial parent has a tre-
mendous power over the noncustodial parent to thwart his attempts to
exercise his visitation rights.
It is considered to be in the best interest of the child to have
"continued contact with noncustodial parents."" Consequently, allowing
the custodial parent vindictively to frustrate visitation would harm both
the noncustodial parent and the child, thus undermining the basic policies
of our law. It is possible that permitting the tort cause of action, in
addition to the alternative remedies already available, would help to
discourage continuing conflicts over child custody and visitation, and
encourage compliance with provisions in separation and divorce decrees.
The focus, however, should be on avoiding initial controversy and
insuring immediate compliance with the custody decree. This is especially
important since children of divorced families have more complex and
difficult developmental needs than the children of intact families.' °°
The use of mediation proceedings has been suggested as the most
positive means for avoiding all post-divorce disputes.10 Nevertheless,
where mediation and other available remedies prove ineffective, the civil
cause of action should be considered. The child needs the most stable,
pleasant atmosphere possible after divorce and should have happy, con-
tinuous contact with both parents without feeling guilty or uneasy. For
these reasons, the tort remedy should be allowed, but only after a
careful screening process has been conducted. Such law suits might serve
to deter undesirable conduct as well as to compensate the aggrieved
parties. Once the parties have met the requirements to undertake such
a lawsuit, additional safeguards within the legal system are present to
insure that a fair result is reached. A fixed or flexible ceiling could be
placed on the amount of damages recoverable, or the trial could be
conducted without a jury in order to avoid the possibility of unduly
burdensome damages. Also, the court could be required to ensure that
the judgment would cause no financial harm to the child, or that the
money recovered be paid into a trust fund in favor of the child.
Louisiana should seriously consider the possible advantages of al-
lowing a civil cause of action for interference with visitation. As men-
tioned, this cause of action should be allowed only after the parties
have exhausted other remedies. This will help to ensure Lhe effectiveness
of the remedy while avoiding additional hardships on all of the parties
involved. Eve Kahao Gonzalez
99. Id.
100. Note, supra note 82, at 1080.
101. Comment, supra note 93.
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